SIX · Administrative Decentralization and the Implementation of Housing Policy in Colombia
BY IRENE FRASER ROTHENBERG
Note: The author is indebted to the Midwest Universities Consortium for International Activities for support for field research in Bogota and Cali. This case study formed a part of the author's Ph.D. dissertation, “Centralization Patterns and Policy Outcomes in Colombia” (University of Illinois, 1973); an earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1975 meetings of the American Society for Public Administration and appeared as “Impacto de la descentralización en la política habitacional de Colombia” in the Revista Latinoamericana de administración pública, August 1975. The author is grateful to Dr. Pedro Pablo Morcillo, Dr. Hans Rother, Dr. Gustavo Espinosa, and Dr. Gerardo Simon, four Colombians who have both studied and contributed to housing policies in their country. The comments of Robert E. Scott, Phillip Monypenny, Peter Bock, and Mauricio Solaun, members of the dissertation committee, also were very valuable to the preparation of this revised version.
ADMINISTRATIVE
decentralization probably is the single structural reform most frequently proposed for Third World countries. As Annmarie Hauck Walsh notes in her comparative analysis of urban politics and intergovernmental relations, the delegation of power to local policy implementors is being debated, demanded, and analyzed by legislators, local politicians, and administrative theorists throughout the world. Almost all of the thirteen countries covered by the Walsh study have proposed or actually taken some measure explicitly designed to deconcentrate governmental authority and strengthen local units of government. 1
1 A. Walsh, The Urban Challenge to Government: An International Comparison of Thirteen Cities (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), p. 154. For other discussions of the impact of decentralization on administrative efficiency, participation, policy outcomes, political integration, and economic development, see United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for Public Administration, Technical Assistance Program, Decentralization for National and Local Development (ST/TAO/M/19) (New York, 1962); H. Maddick, Democracy, Decentralization and Development (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1963); J. LaPalombara, “An Overview of Bureaucracy and Political Development,” in J. LaPalombara, ed.. Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); M. Levy, Modernization and the Structure of Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 58, 488; F. Riggs, “Bureaucrats and Political Development: A Paradoxical View,” in LaPalombara, Bureaucracy and Political Development; G. Almond and S. Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1965), pp. 235-244.
Because support for the principle of administrative decentralization has been so widespread, debate in most countries has focused on how to effect specific transfers of authority to local officials or field offices. There has been little effort to determine whether decentralization is desirable or even feasible in all organizational settings, nor has there been an attempt to pose crucial questions regarding the policy consequences of increasing the autonomy of local and provincial implementors of public policy. For example, administrative theorists imply that decentralization will encourage flexibility and responsiveness in policy implementation by permitting greater participation at the local level, yet “there is little evidence that local government consistently involves broader public participation in decision making than does the central government.” 2 Similarly, assumptions about decentralization presume a division between politics and administration that is never perfect and that is even less perfect in underdeveloped countries where resources are more scarce, civil service employment less pervasive, and political forces more divided. Finally, most proponents of decentralization do not account for the organizational and political setting of local and provincial implementing bodies.
2 Walsh, The Urban Challenge, p. 21.
Failure to consider such variables in the context of decentralization has led to the perpetuation of three fallacies regarding the deconcentration of administrative authority.
First, decentralization is viewed as a singular process, rather than a multi-dimensional set of relationships. Second, decentralization and centralization are treated as opposites in a zero-sum relation, although practical experience suggests that an increase in local roles does not necessarily entail a decrease in central power, and vice versa. And third, futile attempts are made to formulate optimum arrangements for all programs and all times, without regard for variation in values, technologies and geography. 3
3 Ibid., p. 179.
The persistence of these fallacies may explain why in most countries decentralization measures have had little impact on existing patterns of decision making and control. 4 It also suggests the kind of research that must be done so that future plans for decentralization can be more successful. Assumptions regarding the virtues of decentralized implementation patterns must be questioned rather than assumed because potential reformers require information about the real impact of particular distributions of administrative authority within specific organizational settings.
4 Ibid., p. 154.
This volume contains two such efforts. The present chapter examines one rather unsuccessful attempt to temper political centralization with administrative decentralization by bolstering the authority of local housing officials in the provincial city of Cali, Colombia. In the following chapter, Susan Hadden explores a much more successful effort to achieve controlled decentralization in the state of Rajasthan, India.
LOCAL AUTONOMY AND HOUSING POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN CALI
As a centralized Third World country that is undergoing pressure to expand the power of local authorities and at the same time increase governmental responses to urban problems, Colombia provides a good opportunity for testing some fundamental assumptions about the virtues of decentralization. Beginning in the 1960s, the Colombian government became a strong advocate of administrative decentralization. As part of this general policy, the central government began to delegate greater administrative authority to local planning officials and to field offices of the national housing agency, the Instituto de Crédito Territorial, or ICT. As a provincial capital and one of the fastest growing metropolitan areas in Colombia, the city of Cali was a major target of such efforts. Our case study, largely consisting of field research conducted in 1969 and 1970, sought to determine the impact of this decentralization program on the implementation of housing policies in Cali. 5
5 Field research, partially consisting of 56 open-ended interviews with 43 different national and local housing officials in Bogota and Cali, was conducted from September 1969 to August 1970.
By most standards, Colombia was a very centralized country in 1969. Although the legislative body at each level of government - municipal, departmental, and national - was elected by the constituents of each geographical area, the executive branch was hierarchical. The president appointed and could remove at will the governors of all departments and these provincial executives had similar powers over the mayors of all municipalities. Many implementation functions formally assigned to local units of government had been assumed at least partially by national ministries and centralized independent agencies such as the ICT. As a cause and consequence of this national assumption of local administrative functions, central officials controlled a large and increasing pro-portion of governmental revenues. Furthermore, the traditional Conservative and Liberal parties, as well as the newer Alianza Nacional Popular (Anapo) party, were very centralized.
As many Third World countries have discovered, however, vertical centralization does not ensure political unity, for it is often accompanied by structural and party divisions, particularly at the local level. In other words, vertical centralization and horizontal decentralization often coincide. At the time of the case study, Colombia suffered an extreme form of this tendency toward intragovernmental division, thanks to a peculiar constitutional arrangement called the National Front. Under this system, two bitter rivals - the Liberal and the Conservative parties - had agreed to rotate the presidency and to divide equally all other elected and appointed offices. The inevitable result was severe factionalism within both major parties, especially at the municipal level.
Even as they were lamenting one product of centralization - the weakening and fragmentation of local government - the Colombian people were experiencing centralization of a different sort, on a regional level. Like their counterparts throughout the Third World and especially in Latin America, Colombians were migrating from rural areas and concentrating in the large municipalities. The populations of the three major cities - Medellín, Cali, and especially the capital city of Bogota - were growing at a rate grossly disproportional to that of the rest of the country. In the municipality of Cali, capital of the department of Valle del Cauca, the population had grown from 620,000 in 1964 to 950,000 in 1970, and projections indicated a population of 2.9 million by 1985.6 This rapid urbanization posed new problems for the officials of Cali and other major cities. Urban housing deficits multiplied; unsanitary, unsightly, and often illegal migrant settlements lacked basic services; rapidly expanding slums were thought to be a potential source of urban unrest. According to one government report, approximately 55 percent of the people in Cali lived under “highly deficient” housing conditions. 7
6 República de Colombia, Instituto de Crédito Territorial, Apuntes sobre desarrollo urbano: Memorial al VIII Congreso Nacional de Ingenieros (Bogota, 1966), p. 15. For other studies of urbanization in Colombia, see R. Cardona, ed., Migración desarrollo urbano en Colombia (Bogotá: Asociación Colombiana de Facultades de Medicina, División de Estudios de Población, 1970); República de Colombia, Departamento Nacional de Planeación, El desarrollo socio-económico colombiano, diagnóstica político (Bogotá, 1970); H. Mendoza Hoyos, “Características generales de la población colombiana,” in Urbanización marginalidad, 2d ed. (Bogotá: Asociación Colombiana de Facultades de Medicina, Division de Estudios de Población, 1969).
7 A. Osorio and G. Cobo Losado, Cali: Criterios sobre renovación urbana la vivienda marginal (Cali: Instituto de Vivienda de Cali and Oficina de Planeación Municipal, Sección de Renovación Urbana, 1968), p. 28. See also República de Colombia, Departamento Nacional de Planeación, El sector vivienda: Descripción, desarrollo, bases de política (Bogotá, 1970); O. Vallderruten, Mercadeo de vivienda en Cali: Unidad residencial Santiago de Cali (Bogotá: Instituto de Crédito Territorial, n.d.); Valle del Cauca, Oficina de Planeación, Area Metropolitana de Cali (Cali, 1969); P. Morcillo, “El mercado de vivienda en Colombia,” Cabildo: Organo de la Asociación Colombiana de Municipalidades (May-June 1966), pp. 15-17.
Because national concentration of power coincided with regional concentration of the population, the decentralist argument acquired a special meaning in these major urban areas. Cities such as Cali were seen as victims of both urbanization and national dominance. They witnessed a multiplication of responsibilities without a commensurate increase in legal authority or financial capabilities. The promotion of local autonomy was advocated as both a prevention and a cure for urban problems. In short, Colombian reformers assumed that a strong link existed between greater administrative autonomy and increased government attention to housing and other urban problems. The 1968 decision to delegate greater authority to local implementors of housing policies provided an excellent opportunity to determine whether this presumed link indeed would materialize.
Prior to the period under consideration here, almost all governmental housing programs for low-income families in Cali were implemented by the ICT, a national independent agency affiliated with the Ministry of Development. 8 Although this agency had field offices in cities such as Cali, almost all administrative decisions regarding personnel, budgets, housing design, and construction contracts were made in the Bogota office. Like other such agencies, the ICT operated with considerable autonomy at the national level. Presidential decrees regulating independent agencies reserved most controls for the executive, and Congressmen seldom took advantage of their few opportunities to affect institute policy. 9
8 For information regarding the structure and functions of the ICT (Institute of Territorial Credit), see República de Colombia, Presidencia de la República, Secretaría de Organización e Inspección de la Administración Pública, Manual de organización de la rama ejecutiva del poder público (Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1970); República de Colombia, Instituto de Crédito Territorial, Oficina de Organización Métodos, Manual de funcionamiento (Bogotá, 1969); C. Perez et al., “La vivienda,” II: “Estudio del problema,” graduation thesis, Facultad de Arquitectura Universidad del Valle, 1968, 468-472; R. Pineda, “The Colombian Instituto de Crédito Territorial: Housing for Low-Income Families,” in G. Geisse and J. Hardoy, eds., Latin American Urban Research, II (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1972).
9 República de Colombia, Decreto 1050 de 1968; Decreto 3130 de 1968. Although this general legislation leaves open the possibility of direct or indirect congressional representation on the directing boards of such bodies, the president himself appoints all seven ad hoc and ex officio members of the ICT board. See República de Colombia, Decreto 3098 (1963) and Decreto 2168 (1968).
This structural arrangement was advantageous to the ICT in many ways. Because implementors in the field had little power, local political factions and interest groups could not apply pressures at the local level. The high degree of national autonomy facilitated the development of a consistent central housing policy and insulated the institute from local attempts to influence the selection of particular housing projects or construction contracts through party leaders in Congress. These advantages enabled the agency to operate a massive and efficient housing program. Between 1939 and 1970 the ICT built or financed 150,000 dwelling units and helped renovate an additional 77,000 homes. 10 As the third largest city in Colombia, Cali was a major beneficiary of these efforts. The city acquired over 21,000 ICT housing units between 1960 and 1969 alone, and it was scheduled to receive an additional 4,615 in 1970.11
10 Instituto de Crédito Territorial, Informe al Señor Ministro de desarrollo económico, 1970 (Bogotá, 1970), p. 24. For details see other ICT reports including: Informe al Señor Ministro de desarrollo económico, 1968 (Bogotá, 1968); Informe al Señor Ministro de desarrollo económico, 1969 (Bogotá, 1969); and Vivienda desarrollo urbano (Bogotá, n.d.). As usually occurs with housing programs that produce finished housing rather than urbanized lots, most of these units served the middle class (see Rothenberg, “Centralization Patterns and Policy Outcomes in Colombia,” pp. 299-311). For a discussion of the same policy problem in Kenya, see Frederick Temple and Nelle Temple, Chap. 9 in this volume.
11 República de Colombia, Instituto de Crédito Territorial, Seccional Cali, Oficina de Relaciones Públicas, “Número de viviendas e inversiones realizadas en la ciudad de Cali en el período 1960-1969,” mimeographed, July 1970, pp. 1-5.
Although the national ICT was the only Colombian agency implementing large-scale public housing programs, municipalities had considerable formal authority over land use and housing even before the administrative decentralization program began. All municipalities of over 15,000 inhabitants had a legal obligation to allocate two percent of their revenues to the construction of “sanitary housing for the working class.” 12 A 1936 law required that Cali and other large municipalities allocate five percent of their budgets for this purpose. 13 In addition, local bodies had many housing-related powers that were denied the ICT: only municipal officials could tax urban land, establish regulations regarding zoning, construction, and land use, and plan the physical development of Colombian cities. 14
12 República de Colombia, Ley 46 (1918).
13 República de Colombia, Ley 61 (1936); Decreto Ley 1465 (1953). Municipalities with populations of 25,000 or more also have the legal right to expropriate any land required for urban programs such as housing. See República de Colombia, Ley 1 (1943); Ley 81 (1960).
14 See P. Morcillo, “Del deterioro de Cali a una política urbana,” paper prepared for the “Seminario mundial sobre mejoramiento de tugurios asentimientos no controlados,” Medellín, February-March 1970.
The agency specifically empowered to implement Cali's own low-income housing policy was the Instituto de Vivienda de Cali (Cali Housing Institute - Invicali). This local independent agency was created in October 1966 to replace the Personería de Ejidos Vivienda Popular, a body whose sole function was the administration of Cali's ejidos (common public land belonging to the municipality).15 With its new title the agency also acquired authority over many local housing functions, and Invicali became - at least in theory - the municipal equivalent of the ICT. The local agency, like its national counterpart, could plan, build, renovate, rent, and sell either individual homes or housing developments for the lower classes. It could purchase and sell land, and it was empowered to provide credit for the purchase of lots and homes. Furthermore, unlike the ICT, Invicali had the specific function of “gradually eliminating unhealthy or dangerous homes from the urban areas, through appropriate programs of slum clearance, construction, and rehabilitation.” 16
15 See República de Colombia, Ley 41 (1948).
16 Cali, Acuerdo 102 (1966), Art. 4.
Although cities such as Cali had considerable responsibility and legal authority in the area of housing, until 1969 they lacked the resources to fulfill most of these obligations in a meaningful way. Because it did not have enough money to undertake major construction or renewal projects, Invicali limited its activity to more modest pursuits. It studied the needs of slum areas; it mediated squatter attempts to acquire legal ownership of occupied land; and it administered ejidos. 17 In short, all effective housing power was still vested in the central office of the national ICT because of its control over funds.
17 Cali, Instituto de Vivienda de Cali, “Invicali: Editorial,” mimeographed; Instituto de Vivienda de Cali and Oficina de Planeación Municipal, p. 22.
The administrative decentralization movement produced two measures designed to bring the implementation of national housing policy down to the local level. The first was a mild effort to de-concentrate the ICT itself by granting additional administrative authority to field offices in cities such as Cali. Part of this reform entailed the establishment of citizen advisory boards within each regional office. But the new ICT advisors, embroiled in controversies over contracts and other matters of material interest, very shortly proved intolerably disruptive to the formerly insulated and apolitical ICT field officers in Cali. When the terms of the original advisors expired, the ICT quietly shelved all plans for appointing a new group.
Our study focuses on the second, more ambitious effort to decentralize the implementation of housing programs. In 1968, the ICT decided to loan Invicali $540,000 (10.8 million pesos) for a massive and well-publicized slum clearance project in Cali. The program involved the removal of three centrally located and densely populated slums - Fátima, Berlin, and San Francisco - and the construction of new homes on the urban periphery. The remainder of the $900,000 project was to be financed by a $250,000 USAID loan, other loans totaling about $20,000, and $90,000 from the municipal budget of Cali. 18
18 See Cali, Instituto de Vivienda de Cali, “Presupuesto del Instituto de Vivienda de Cali Invicali para la Vigencia de 1970” (November 1969). The text accompanying this budget points out that “if the subsidy from the municipality of Cali were appropriated in accordance with Ley 61 (1936)... it would reach 5,260,000 pesos.” The budget also includes a projected transfer of more than one million pesos from Emsirva. According to Invicali officials, the Emsirva quota never was delivered - nor was it ever really expected. See also El Pais (Cali), October 16, 1969, p. 7. One peso equaled approximately US $0.05 in 1970.
If the first reform effort was a disappointment, the second was a disaster. By the summer of 1970, Invicali and its project were totally discredited and the ICT had assumed complete responsibility for implementing the slum clearance project. Although the failure of this particular program caused considerable political embarrassment for individual power-holders in Cali, the real culprit was the very fragmented power structure within the city. As the following analysis of the Invicali experience illustrates, geographical or vertical centralization in Colombia coexists with local horizontal decentralization, a fragmentation of municipal power that undermines efforts to increase local autonomy and governmental activity at the same time. Because other Third World countries with a long history of centralization may share this same tendency toward local disunity, the painful experience of Invicali provides a valuable lesson for would-be reformers in other major urban areas.
Fragmentation of Administrative Roles
The local government of Cali can be described as a “council-dominated” system where “councilmen play a dominant part in the exercise of executive roles that are fragmented among specialized boards, committees, or individuals.” 19 Although Colombian municipal councils clearly perform many legislative duties, they have considerable executive authority as well; in fact, the Colombian Constitution classifies these bodies as “administrative corporations.” 20 In keeping with this formal designation, the Cali Council either performs or controls a wide range of administrative functions. Of the sixty-four local ordinances passed between 1966 and 1968, for example, nine were significant legislative acts - setting the municipal budget, establishing guidelines for independent agencies, and creating municipal offices or agencies. Forty-five, however, were acts involving minor budgetary alterations, the purchase and sale of public land, and other details of local management. Another ten ordinances focused on such symbolic gestures as designating street names and honoring civic leaders. 21 This council participation in the minutiae of local government inevitably fragments executive roles by limiting the mayor's control over local administration.
19 Walsh, The Urban Challenge, p. 103.
20 See República de Colombia, Constitución Política de la República de Colombia (Serrano, 1969), Art. 196.
21 See Rothenberg, “Centralization Patterns and Policy Outcomes in Colombia,” p. 226 for a more thorough analysis of these ordinances.
The establishment of semiindependent single purpose implementing agencies such as Invicali further atomizes local administrative authority. Organization charts of the municipality depict the mayor as the administrative chief; under him appear the Departments of Education, Government, Public Works, Public Health, etc. As at the national level, however, independent agencies provide most of the major services such as roads and sidewalks (Valorización), parks and sanitation (Emsirva), or water, sewage, electricity, and telephones (Emcali). By 1969, these newer bodies had acquired resources and powers that completely overshadowed those of the municipality itself. The expenditures of Emcali ($27.4 million), Valorización ($4.2 million), Emsirva ($2 million), and Invicali ($.6 million) accounted for over nine-tenths of the combined local agency budgets, while the $4.2 million spent by the municipality itself represented only one-tenth. Even more importantly, neither the mayor nor the council as a body had much control over these expeditures, for only the Valorización budget required council approval. 22
22 P. Morcillo, “La nueva administración municipal: Bases para una reforma administrativa,” Cabildo: Organo de la Asociación Colombiana de Municipalidades (September-October 1969), p. 54.
But local independent agencies differ from their national counterparts in one very significant way. Central bodies such as the ICT are tied to the executive branch; most controls over local agencies emanate from the municipal council. In fact, councilmen often establish these agencies as a very deliberate device to take power away from the mayor. 23 The mayor lacks the extensive decree power accorded the president, for example, and thus the municipal council must pass all changes in the structure and functions of Invicali. 24 Similarly, because the local executive does not enjoy the budgetary prerogatives of his national counterpart, councilmen have a large role in determining the size of municipal grants to Invicali.
23 V. Contreras, Barrancabermeja: Estudio socioeconómico administrativo del municipio (Bogotá: Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico, Universidad de los Andes, 1970), p. 17. See also Morcillo, “La Nueva Administración,” pp. 50-57.
24 Cali, Acuerdo 102 (1966).
Domination of the board of directors undoubtedly is the most critical source of legislator influence over Invicali. While Congress names no ICT directors, councilmen provide, from their own ranks, four of the eight Invicali directors. The other four include the mayor or his representative, the manager of Emcali, the head of the Municipal Planning Office or his representative, and “a representative designated by the financiers of Invicali.” 25 At most, the mayor can count on two votes in board deliberations - his own and that of his appointee, the planning manager. Councilmen, on the other hand, have four votes. This weighting of the board in favor of the local legislature is crucial because the directors personally make most of the major - and minor - decisions regarding agency staffing and administrative details in the implementation of particular housing programs.
25 Cali, Acuerdo 102, Art. 12.
Authority to select personnel was the most jealously guarded prerogative of the directors serving in 1969-1970. The board was authorized “to intervene in the appointment of Institute officials paid monthly salaries of 2,000 pesos [$100] or more.” 26 This stipulation applied to fifteen of Invicali's forty-five employees in June 1970.27 Interviews with board members indicated that this particular responsibility was taken most seriously because personnel questions provided a battleground for political rivalries among directors. The ordinance was vague about what this authority to “intervene” in personnel selection actually meant, particularly since the Invicali manager had the authority to “appoint and remove all employees.” 28 In practice, however, this intervention was extensive, because the directors selected the manager. The ordinance solemnly noted that six board members must approve the selection of manager and that the latter is “elected for a two-year period,” but the next sentence pointed out that this manager “may be removed freely by the same board.” 29
26 Cali, Acuerdo 102, Art. 15, sec. o.
27 Information computed from Invicali personnel files.
28 Cali, Acuerdo 102 (1966), Art. 17, sec. f.
29 Cali, Acuerdo 102, Art. 16.
Directors also had - and exercised - many controls over the structure and policies of the agency. They were required to approve the budget and all contracts and other financial transactions; they organized and regulated the institution's structure; and they established the rent and selling price of all Invicali properties. 30 Invicali directors spent many meeting hours deliberating the details of such decisions. According to one director, they sometimes spent hours discussing what to do about the fact that someone had not paid the rent.
30 Cali, Acuerdo 102, Art. 15.
In short, councilmen exerted a strong influence on Invicali operations. As a member of the Invicali board and as the initiator of much local legislation, the mayor did have some housing powers, but the strength of council control over Invicali caused at least fragmentation - and probably council dominance - of both administrative and legislative housing roles. In other words, control over Invicali operations was divided between the mayor and the councilmen, and the latter probably had the upper hand.
Ironically, national (and international) subsidies or loans to local institutions often exacerbate this local fragmentation of power by channeling funds directly to local independent agencies instead of through the mayor. The situation of Invicali was somewhat exceptional because this housing institute was the only Cali agency receiving a subsidy from the 1969 budget and because the 1969 national grant to Invicali took the form of a loan. But even in this case, national funds were able to substitute vertical controls for horizontal ones. As stated earlier, Invicali received almost $90,000 from the municipality in 1969, but it also acquired an ICT loan of $540,000.31 Because of the size of the ICT loan, the national agency became concerned about Invicali operations, and central housing officials became involved in many aspects of the local housing project. If the local agency was answerable to the city administration, it was even more answerable to the ICT.
31 Cali, Acuerdo 005 (1968) (Presupuesto para 1969), p. 4. International loans can have a similar effect. The World Bank granted Emcali a $27.5 million loan in 1970. See El Pais(Cali), April 10, 1970. The municipality itself acquired only $50 in national or international funds that year.
Partisan and Factional Divisions
The structure of local government and the distribution of budgetary resources combine to encourage the fragmentation of municipal power in housing and other policy areas. During the 1969-1970 case study period, the structure of the local party system ensured this fragmentation by fomenting divisions among council-men and therefore inevitably politicizing the implementing agencies they controlled. Although the Colombian party system tends to be centralized geographically under the leadership of self-perpetuating national directorates, it usually is divided at each level of government. The historical polarization of the Colombian electorate around the Liberal and Conservative party labels divides the nation into two camps - often armed - recruited on the basis of “hereditary hatreds.” 32 This mutual antagonism between the two parties has not brought unity in either of them, however. Party identification has been a given, and disputes over personalities, ideologies, jobs, and interests have occurred within the parties. 33
32 R. Dix, Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 205-216. One recent result was La Violencia, a period of civil war followed by Gustavo Rojas Pinilla's 1953-1957 military dictatorship.
33 See Dix, Colombia, pp. 216-221; J. Martz, Colombia: A Contemporary Political Survey (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1962), pp. 33-147; J. Payne, Patterns of Conflict in Colombia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 194-196.
At the time of the case study, Colombia was living under a unique constitutional arrangement designed to correct the excesses produced by the historical division between the two parties. Distressed over both the continuing violence and party exclusion from political life, Liberal and Conservative leaders had signed the Pact of Sitges on July 20, 1957, establishing a National Front government. This agreement, sanctioned by a 1957 plebiscite and broadened by later interparty negotiations, introduced three important constitutional changes. The first was the principle of parity, which established that Liberals and Conservatives should divide equally all seats in all legislative bodies. The Constitution required parity in appointed positions as well, from the Supreme Court down to the lowest positions in the local bureaucracies and independent agencies. Probably by intent, the equal division of power between the two groups excluded challenging political movements, although new groups managed to evade this problem to some extent by tacking “Liberal” or “Conservative” tags on their party labels. A predictable but unintended effect of the parity arrangement was the increase of factionalism within the traditional parties. Each party was guaranteed half of the legislative seats. Because the determination of which individuals would hold these reserved seats followed a system of proportional representation, ambitious political groups drew up separate party slates, competing among themselves for shares of the fixed Conservative or Liberal quota.
To keep one party or another from single-handedly dominating any institution, the Constitution introduced a second requirement that most measures must be decided by a two-thirds majority vote. This provision obviously increased the ability of all legislatures to impede or delay governmental programs. A third amendment introduced the principle of alternation in the presidency, stipulating that this office alternate every four years between the two parties. This provision, like the parity arrangement, discouraged new political groups but promoted factionalism within the traditional parties. 34
34 Most of these amendments remained in effect at the time of this investigation, although the 1968 constitutional reform provides for their gradual phaseout. In 1970 the parity principle did not apply to elections for the municipal councils or departmental assemblies; the 1974 elections required neither parity for Congress nor alternation for the presidency; and in 1978 the parity requirement was dropped for appointment of governors, mayors, and other administrative officials. The 1968 constitutional reform dropped the two-thirds rule for legislation, except in matters relating to the National Front phaseout itself. See Constitución política de la República de Colombia, Arts. 83, 114, 120, and 172.
One of the most important consequences of the National Front was a multiplication and an escalation of conflict in the municipality. The fragmentation of the two vertically centralized and competitive parties encouraged conflict among councilmen and thereby imposed new bases for division on a fragmented governmental structure. National dominance of these factions further disrupted local government by accelerating turnover within local legislatures. Because councilmen played a vital role in local bodies such as Invicali, this atomization and discontinuity inevitably carried over to independent agencies as well.
The 1968-1970 Cali Council reflected both the constitutionally supported bifurcation between Liberals and Conservatives and the attendant factionalism as well. The sixteen councilmen who served during the case study period represented six different factions, three Liberal and three Conservative. This factionalism continued despite the 1970 abandonment of the parity requirement for local legislatures. The 1970 elections saw nineteen slates for the twenty council seats and produced councilmen representing seven different factions. 35
35 The number of seats on the Cali Council was expanded prior to the 1970 elections. The distribution of seats among factions is determined by using an “electoral quotient.” “The quotient is the number which results from dividing the total number of valid votes by the number of seats available.... The distribution of seats to each list will be done in proportion to the number of times which the quotient fits into the number of valid votes.” (During the National Front, the number of valid party votes, rather than the total number of valid votes, was used as the base.) See Constitución política, Art. 172. The candidates whose names appear first on the faction lists are seated first.
Central control of Colombian parties and their factions further eroded the unity of local government by ensuring continual rotation of councilmen. An examination of Cali's Gazeta Municipal reveals that 180 different individuals were councilmen or alternates between 1958 and 1972.36 Since elections occur every two years, a legislator sitting continuously since 1958 would have served seven terms. As Table 6-1 indicates, however, no individual served seven terms, and 149 of the 180 sat on the council for only two years. Most of these single-term councilmen retired not through electoral defeat but because they lost or abdicated favored positions on the faction candidate lists. Incumbents seldom were nominated again; even those heading faction lists tended to be newcomers. The 1970 election, for example, produced seven winning slates for the Cali Council. Of the seven individuals heading these slates, only two were former councilmen. Similarly, only two alternates heading their lists had council experience. The Liberales Oficialistas had five council seats in 1968 and six seats in 1970, but only the head of the ticket served during both terms.
36 An alternate or suplente is a substitute who takes office if a councilman cannot serve. This substitution occurs quite frequently because the councilman often wins simultaneous election to a higher office. Legislators serving more than one term frequently alternate between councilman and alternate status. For this reason, these alternates are included in our calculations of turnover in the municipal council.
TABLE 6-1 TENURE OF CALI COUNCILMEN AND ALTERNATES, 1958-1972
Source: Computed from Cali, Gazeta Municipal, 1958-1970.
Because central party and faction leaders controlled the nomination process at all levels of government, municipal councils became appendages of the national parties; by nationalizing political rewards, vertical centralization in the party system exacerbated political fractionalization at the municipal level. 37 The position of local legislator in a city the size of Cali frequently was a trial run for aspirants to a political career; thus six of the ten senators representing Valle del Cauca in the 1970 Congress were former Cali councilmen. Three of the four senators lacking experience on the Cali Council became new councilmen in 1970.38 This occurred because party and faction leaders, anxious to retain control over the legislatures of major cities, often chose prominent national figures to head local lists. In the 1970 Cali election, for example, the victorious council candidates represented seven separate lists, headed in every case by a nationally prominent individual. Three men topped lists for both the Senate and the Cali Council; one woman led her faction's slate for the House and for the Cali Council; presidential candidate Belisario Betancur headed a fifth council slate; the sixth was led by a past House member and unsuccessful Senate candidate in 1970; and a nationally prominent Communist headed the seventh slate.
37 P. Morcillo and H. Castaño, “La Administración financiamiento de los municipios de los departamentos con referencia exclusiva al Valle del Cauca,” La nueva economía, IV (June 1968), 112.
38 See Cali, Gazeta Municipal, 1958-1970. The one senator who was neither an old nor a new councilman in 1970 was a former governor of Valle.
As a result, parties and factions were so centralized that councilmen had neither the time nor the motivation to become involved with local issues or to forge policy-oriented alliances with their fellow councilmen. To succeed, a local legislator must advance the interests of his faction. He must oppose the mayor if their factions are in conflict; he must seek employment for local faction members; and he must limit the powers and activities of institutions headed by opponents.
The Politicization of Invicali
Independent agencies such as Invicali provide excellent sites for these partisan and factional skirmishes; they continuously award contracts, hire new employees, and undertake well-publicized public works projects. The division of executive roles in Cali ensured councilmen a strong voice in such decisions, but party divisions discouraged these local legislators from speaking in harmony. The National Front parity requirement escalated the level of conflict by guaranteeing the representation of rival groups on the Invicali board and thereby politicizing even the most mundane administrative decisions made by the agency.
Between 1969 and 1970, the frequency and intensity of such political conflicts virtually paralyzed the operations of Invicali. The board was riddled with personal antagonisms as well as bitter political rivalries. The urban renewal project was virtually stagnant, and the agency was discredited at both the national and local levels. Officials from the ICT, the council, the mayor's office, and Invicali itself charged that political intrigues always absorbed the energies of the local housing agency. Board members echoed this denunciation, although each director placed the blame on the others. According to the directors and the other Invicali officials interviewed, the agency had been a center for petty political quarrels since its days as the Personería de Ejidos. Board meetings became chaotic quarrels because factions opposed to the manager trusted neither his judgment nor his competence, and the various factions represented on the board were more concerned with personnel than with housing policy. These antagonisms among directors extended far beyond the political level. Some directors claimed they stopped attending meetings because of their intense dislike for other individuals present. Respondents frequently accused other directors and top Invicali officials of dishonesty, corruption, criminal activities, and sexual deviance. Whatever the truth of these charges, their frequency attests to the high level of politicization and conflict among the directors and staff of the implementing agency.
These bitter and intense divisions on the board created a direct impediment to Invicali activity. Political rather than technical factors determined where the agency bought land, legalized squatter settlements, or directed urban renewal efforts. For example, one important Invicali function was to regularize illegal settlements by mediating and arranging the purchase by squatters of the land they occupied (“legalization”). As a past Invicali official pointed out, however, the politically divided directors were unable to authorize a comprehensive solution to this problem.
Legalization is a mess because each faction wants to get credit for it. When we were in Invicali, we studied the problem for a long time and presented a general plan for legalization of these squatter settlements. We would purchase the land with bonds and then sell the property to the squatters at a low cost. But the Board did not approve the proposal because two competing factions united against it. They didn't want our faction to get credit for the plan. They were afraid we would make political capital out of it and use it in the next elections. They were correct, of course. 39
39 Personal Interview, April 15, 1970.
Because antagonistic directors attached strategic value to policy questions, discussion of these issues commonly produced deadlock on the Invicali board. An even more significant deterrent to housing activity was the relatively low priority of these policy questions themselves. In other words, directors did divide over issues, but they focused most of their energies on other matters. According to most respondents, personnel selection was the primary concern of directors, and the major battles among directors involved the distribution of patronage jobs in the agency. During the National Front, the parity requirement guaranteed equal representation of Liberals and Conservatives, but the strength of each faction on the board determined which particular groups of Liberals and Conservatives received Invicali positions.
The shifting strength of each faction on this patronage-oriented board in turn produced an extremely high turnover of Invicali/employees. Table 6-2 shows that 36 of the 45 people working for the agency in June of 1970 arrived less than a year before, while only four individuals had over two years experience with the agency. More importantly, new appointees filled all but one of the 15 managerial posts, the positions paying over 2,000 pesos ($100) a month and therefore requiring board intervention. Although an expansion of the agency in 1969 accounted for some of these new faces, most of the arrivals were part of a very rapid and continuing pattern of turnover within the agency. The three years between June 1967 and June 1970 saw the arrival and subsequent departure of 53 employees. Thirty-one of these people served less than one year. 40
40 Computed from Invicali personnel files.
TABLE 6-2 TENURE OF INVICALI EMPLOYEES AS OF JUNE 22, 1970
Source: Computed from Invicali personnel files. Figures include time spent by employees in the Personería de Ejidos before 1967. Percentages do not add to 100 because of rounding.
Turnover during the case study period reached dizzying proportions. In July of 1969, Alfonso Mora Rengifo became Invicali's fourth manager in two years. The very next month saw the departure of 11 employees, and September brought 23 new people to the agency. By June 22, 1970, Mora Rengifo had fired or accepted resignations from 31 employees and hired 42 people - a remarkable achievement, considering the fact that the agency's total June payroll included only 45 people. 41 Although the turnover rate had dwindled by April and May, agency officials already were packing their bags in anticipation of a new purge. The manager faced a crisis on the board, and the council elections completed in April would put different factions in control of Invicali. Few housing officials expected to survive. 42
41 Computed from Invicali personnel files.
42 Mora Rengifo himself resigned in July 1970.
In Colombia, as in most Third World countries, high turnover rates are very common in municipal governments. Low pay scales, the lack of civil service regulations, and the higher prestige accorded national governmental bodies all contribute to this problem. 43 These factors, however, do not account for the exceptionally short tenure of Invicali officials. At the beginning of 1970, less than 10 percent of the total number of municipal employees in Cali's departments had held their jobs for less than a year, but new Invicali recruits accounted for 80 percent of that agency's employees. As Table 6-3 reveals, the percentage of inexperienced Invicali officials finds no equal in any dependency of Cali's executive branch or in the local office of the ICT.
43 See Morcillo and Castaño, “La administración,” p. 118.
TABLE 6-3 TENURE OF LOCAL EMPLOYEES IN 1970, BY INSTITUTION
Sources: Invicali figures are computed from personnel files for the agency, June 22, 1970. ICT figures are computed from personnel files of ICT, Cali office, June 30, 1970. Others are from Eduardo Caicedo Ruiz, unpublished M.A. thesis research, Department of Industrial Administration, Universidad del Valle, 1970. Percentages do not add to 100 because of rounding.
Only the agency's legislative ties can explain the extremely short tenure of Invicali employees. Municipal housing officials, in contrast to their colleagues in the regular city administration and in the ICT Cali field office, served at the whim of a very politicized and very divided board dominated by councilmen, and the agency was sensitive to any shift in the strength of alliances or factions in the legislature. Both the directors and the employees of Invicali recognized this. Board members frequently referred to “my secretaries” or “his bookkeeper,” and employees measured their days by the power of their political patrons.
The Paralysis of Policy Implementation
Normal activity was impossible under these circumstances. By the time an employee had located his desk, it seemed he must begin to clean it out. Formal lines of administrative authority were ineffective because workers owed their positions to outside politicians rather than to their temporary superiors. Institutional loyalties failed to develop because there was not enough time and because employees resented the insecurity of their positions. At best, one wave of officials would manage to lay the groundwork for implementing a project, but the next group would be unwilling to follow through on plans bearing the signatures of predecessors.
Perhaps more importantly, personnel disputes and other patronage concerns left little time for policy implementation. A confrontation among directors in April 1970, illustrates this problem. 44 Several councilmen on the board were displeased because recent personnel shifts had favored rival factions, and these disgruntled legislators demanded the resignation of the manager, Mora Rengifo. Intrafactional rivalry between the mayor and Mora's supporters complicated this crisis. Directors spent the next two months circulating petitions, issuing press releases, and negotiating the factional representation of Invicali employees. Mora and several others resigned in July. The board then commenced meetings to elect a new manager, but by this time the councilmen elected in April were ready to replace the directors themselves. During this entire period, the political crisis took precedence over the work of the agency itself. The board was not discussing issues, and the employees spent their time reading help wanted ads. Because confrontations of this nature were very frequent, directors had little time or energy for implementing housing programs.
44 See El Pais and Occidente (Cali), April-July 1970.
The recurring personnel crises, the high turnover of employees, and the extreme levels of politicization virtually paralyzed the agency during the period of the case study. The widely publicized slum clearance and relocation project experienced one delay after another. Since at that time Invicali was the only local body empowered to implement housing programs, and since this institution received all of the municipal funds designated for low-cost housing, stagnation of the agency meant immobilization of all municipal construction efforts.
The escalation of paralyzing political crises within Invicali coincided with mounting public pressures for action. The squatter settlements slated for clearance were located along the Cauca river; sewage flowing into the river posed a permanent health hazard and periodic floods exacerbated the problem. Nevertheless, a 1968 government survey revealed that residents of Fátima, Berlin, and San Francisco, like the Brazilian favella dwellers described by Janice Perlman in Chapter Ten of this volume, initially rejected the idea of relocation because they could not afford to pay for lodging or land and because their present homes were close to transportation and employment facilities. A concentrated effort by social workers in 1969 secured a reversal of this opinion, so that by the time of the case study it was reported that 80 percent of the affected residents favored the Invicali project. 45 This increasing acceptance of the project coincided with the decreasing ability of Invicali to deliver. Public pressures began to mount, no doubt fanned by political opponents of the Invicali manager. A severe flood in June of 1970 turned this grumbling into outrage. A short but powerful rainstorm caused polluted waters to rush through the squatter settlements, sweeping away seven makeshift homes and causing extensive flood damage to almost all of the others. 46 Four days later, over a thousand victims demonstrated before municipal offices, demanding official attention to this latest calamity, and the press reported rumors that residents of areas slated for clearance intended to implement the Invicali project themselves by taking over the land designated for their new homes. 47
45 Instituto de Crédito Territorial, Seccional Cali, “Resultados de investigación e informe sobre la zona de tugurios de los barrios Fátima, Berlin, San Francisco de la Ciudad de Cali” (Cali, Colombia: República de Colombia, n.d.).
46 Occidente (Cali), June 13, 1970, p. 3.
47 Ibid., June 17, 1970, p. 3; El Tiempo (Bogotá), June 28, 1970, p. 19.
The result was inevitable. The ICT purchased the land acquired by the local agency for the housing plan and assumed total responsibility for the Invicali project. 48 This “nationalization” of the housing program encountered no local resistance. Municipal stalemate produced centralization by default and thus reinforced the traditional Colombian pattern of vertical centralization and horizontal decentralization. Just as national dominance of legal authority, financial resources, and partisan controls aggravated the atomization of local power, this municipal fragmentation in turn left national implementing agencies as the only alternative to inertia or chaos,
48 Instituto de Crédito Territorial, Seccional Cali, Oficina de Relaciones Públicas, “Programa de erradicación de tugurios de los barrios Fátima, Berlin, y San Francisco” (Cali, Colombia: Republica de Colombia, July 1970); Occidente (Cali), July 14, 1970, p. 15.
LOCAL AUTONOMY AND POLICY IMPLEMENTATION: SOME CONCLUSIONS
The Invicali fiasco was extremely painful - to embarrassed local officials, to harried national housing experts, and, most of all, to the homeless of Cali. One hopes, therefore, that some benefit might be derived from this experience, that insights drawn from this case might provide a valuable and less painful lesson for officials in other Third World countries.
Is it possible to generalize from the Invicali experience? The particulars of the case certainly are uncommon: a history of bitter - often violent - party rivalry, a bizarre constitutional configuration that no longer exists even in Colombia, and an ill-timed flood. These factors combined to make decentralization a disaster. But the lesson of Invicali is much broader. Clearly there are circumstances under which decentralization is disadvantageous and would-be reformers well might examine some of these circumstances before leaping aboard the decentralist bandwagon. In particular, the Cali case suggests that one might look for the following danger signals:
1. A structurally divided local government. Devolution of authority from an executive-dominated central government to a less unified local administration inevitably will slow the pace of implementation, at least temporarily.
2. A politically divided local government. Factionalism may have reached unprecedented levels in National Front Colombia, but milder instances of local disunity are quite frequent in the Third World.
3. A patronage-oriented party system. In Third World countries with high unemployment and ineffective civil service systems, patronage concerns may be paramount to local leaders. The combination of patronage and intense party rivalry can be devastating, as we have seen.
4. Historically unresponsive local agencies. One could readily collect examples of local institutions that are not accountable to their constituencies or clientele groups. Yet there are other cities in which local officials traditionally are far more responsible. One explanation for such differences may be divergences in political culture from one city to the next, even within the same country. In Colombia, for example, the political structure and political culture of Medellín (capital of the department of Antioquía) differs dramatically from that of Cali. Residents of Medellín are said to be more hardworking, responsible, and civic-minded, more imbued with the “Protestant ethic.” 49 It is interesting to note that the ICT was relatively pleased with its efforts to decentralize in Medellín. The political culture of Cali, unfortunately, probably is more typical of the country as a whole.
49 See for example D. Dent, “Oligarchy and Power Structure in Urban Colombia: The Case of Cali,” Latin American Studies, VI (1974), 113-133; A. Portes and J. Walton, Urban Latin America: The View from Above and Below (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1976), chap. 4; L. Fajardo, The Protestant Ethic of the Antioqueños: Social Structure and Personality (Cali: Ediciones Departamento de Sociología, Universidad del Valle, n.d.).
It is not likely that all of these danger signals will appear in most Third World cities - at least one hopes not - but it is quite possible that at least one will be present. The Cali case shows that these four factors in the aggregate can spell disaster for a decentralization effort. Even separately, however, they might prove troublesome.
In short, the lesson of Invicali is that increasing the autonomy of a fragmented local government almost inevitably slows the pace of implementation. Other Third World countries are not apt to encounter the same divisive forces faced by the Colombian municipality; in fact, the end of the National Front already is altering the nature of party competition in Cali itself. But it is likely that many other local governments face comparable levels of institutional, budgetary, or partisan fragmentation. Ironically, this local disunity may be most prevalent in those countries needing decentralization the most, for vertical centralization and local fragmentation seem to be mutually reinforcing.
As Susan Hadden shows in the following chapter on controlled decentralization in Rajasthan, India, administrative decentralization is not always a disastrous political reform. The careful, selective, and controlled delegation of authority to a reasonably competent and politically unified local or provincial government undoubtedly can yield administrative efficiency rather than administrative inertia. In fact, even in Colombia there may be one or two cities such as Medellín which could use such powers wisely. In a politically fragmented city such as the Cali of 1969-1970, however, controlled decentralization was ineffective, for there was no power center to control and therefore no activity to channel. Even the ICT's substantial influence over the allocation of Invicali money could not defeat the forces of inertia. Although the ICT could have prevented the local agency from doing the wrong thing, it was powerless to prevent inaction.
Local autonomy may be pursued as an end in itself, as a value more important than substantive policy outcomes. If it is advocated as a means, however, decision makers must question rather than assume the relationship between administrative decentralization and successful implementation of public policy. The homeless of Cali probably receive little comfort from the knowledge that the public officials who failed to act live in Cali rather than in Bogotá.
عدم تمرکز اجرایی و پیاده سازی سیاست گذاری مسکن در کلمبیا
توسط IRENE FRASER ROTHENBERG
توجه: نویسنده برای فعالیت های بین المللی حمایت از تحقیقات در بوگوتا و کالی مدیون کنسرسیوم دانشگاه های میدوست می باشد. این مطالعه موردی بخشی از پایان نامه دکتری نویسنده با عنوان «الگوی تمرکز و نتایج خط مشی در کلمبیا» (دانشگاه ایلینوی، 1973) می باشد؛ که یک نسخه قبلی از این مقاله در جلسات انجمن جامعه مدنی آمریکا در سال 1975 ارائه شده و در اوت 1975 به عنوان «تاثیر عدم تمرکز مجلس نمایندگان در کلمبیا» به نمایش درآمد. نویسنده از دکتر پدرو پابلو مورسیلو، دکتر هانس روتر، دکتر گوستاو اسپینوزا و دکتر جراردو سیمون، چهار کلمبیایی که برای سیاست گذاری در حوزه مسکن کشورشان مطالعه و کمک کرده اند، سپاسگزاری می کند. نظرات اعضای کمیته پایان نامه؛ رابرت.ای. اسکات، فیلیپ مینیپنی، پیتر بوک و موریسیو سولون، نیز برای تهیه نسخه تجدید نظر بسیار ارزشمند بودند.
اجرا
عدم تمرکز احتمالاً تنها بخش اصلاحات ساختاری است که اغلب برای کشورهای جهان سوم پیشنهاد می شود. همانطور که آنمریک هائوک والش در تحلیل مقایسه ای خود به سیاست های شهری و روابط بین دولتی اشاره می کند، واگذاری قدرت برای اجرای سیاست های محلی، مورد بحث، بررسی و تحلیل قانونگذاران، سیاستمداران محلی و نظریه پردازان امور اجرایی در سراسر جهان قرار گرفته است. تقریباً تمام سیزده کشور تحت پوشش مطالعات والش تعدادی از معیارهایی را که به صراحت طراحی شده اند، برای عدم تمرکز قدرت (اختیار) حکومت و تقویت واحدهای محلی حکومت در نظر گرفته اند.
از آنجا که حمایت از اصل عدم تمرکز برای امور اجرایی تاکنون گسترش یافته، بحث در اکثر کشورها بر نحوه تاثیر انتقال قدرت به مقامات محلی یا ادارات محلی تمرکز دارد. تلاش های کمی برای تعیین اینکه آیا در تمام شرایط سازمانی عدم تمرکز مطلوب و یا حتی قابل اجرا می باشد انجام شده است، و نیز هیچ تلاشی برای مطرح کردن سوالات حیاتی در مورد پیامدهای سیاست افزایش خودمختاری ناظران محلی و استانی از سیاست عمومی وجود ندارد. به عنوان مثال، نظریه پردازان اموری اجرایی استدلال می کنند که عدم تمرکز با اجازه به مشارکت بیشتر در سطح محلی، انعطاف پذیری و پاسخگویی را در اجرای سیاست تشویق می کند. با این حال «شواهد کمی وجود دارد که دولت محلی به طور مداوم مشارکت عمومی گسترده ای را در تصمیم گیری نسبت به دولت مرکزی دارد». به طور مشابه، فرضیه هایی درباره عدم تمرکز، تقسیمات بین سیاست و حکومت را در نظر می گیرند ولی هرگز کامل نیستند و حتی در کشورهای توسعه نیافته که منابع کمتری دارند، مشاغل خدمات عمومی کمتر نفوذ پیدا کردند و نیروهای سیاسی بیشتر تقسیم می شوند. در نهایت اکثر طرفداران عدم تمرکز، تشکیل سازمان سیاسی و سازمان های اجرایی محلی را در نظر نمی گیرند.
عدم در نظر گرفتن چنین متغیرهایی در زمینه عدم تمرکز منجر به حفظ سه اشتباه در مورد عدم تمرکز قدرت اجرایی شده است.
اول، عدم تمرکز به عنوان یک فرآیند منحصر به فرد به جای یک مجموعه چند بعدی از روابط مشاهده می شود. دوم، عدم تمرکز و تمرکز به طور مخالف در یک رابطه مجموع-صفر به حساب می آیند، اگر چه تجربه عملی نشان می دهد که افزایش نقش محلی ضرورتاً باعث کاهش قدرت مرکزی نمی شود و بالعکس. و سوم، تلاش های بیهوده برای تدوین ترتیبات بهینه برای همه برنامه ها و همه زمان ها بدون توجه به تغییر ارزش ها، فن آوری ها و جغرافیا صورت می گیرد.
پایداری این اشتباهات ممکن است توضیح دهد که چرا در اکثر کشورها اقدامات عدم تمرکز تاثیر کمی بر الگوهای موجود تصمیم گیری و کنترل دارند. همچنین پیشنهاد می شود که این نوع پژوهش ها باید انجام شود تا برنامه های آینده برای عدم تمرکز بتوانند بیشتر موفق باشند. فرضیه های مربوط به مزایای الگوهای پیاده سازی غیر متمرکز، به جای آن که فرض کنند اصلاح طلبان بالقوه نیاز به اطلاعاتی در مورد تاثیر واقعی توزیع خاص قدرت اجرایی در تنظیمات سازمانی خاص دارند، باید مورد سئوال قرار گیرد.
این پژوهش شامل دو فصل است. در این فصل، تلاش ناموفق برای تحکیم تمرکز سیاسی با عدم تمرکز اجرایی با تقویت اقتدار مقامات مسکن محلی در شهر والیت کالی کلمبیا مورد بررسی قرار می گیرد. در فصل بعد، سوزان هادن تلاش فزاینده برای دستیابی به عدم تمرکز کنترل شده در ایالت راجستان هند را بررسی می کند.
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